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Introduction: The Bodily Self
Concepts such as consciousness and the self have proven notoriously diffi-
cult to define and have yielded enormous amounts of literature in a large
array of disciplines (e.g., Bermu´dez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1995; Metzinger,
2003). Recently, these concepts have been approached from the biological
side by investigating their neurobiology and more generally how they are
grounded in the organism and its physiology (i.e., the body). Neuroscient-
ists, neurologists, experimental psychologists, and philosophers have joined
forces and developed several lines of research trying to understand how the
central nervous system dynamically represents the body and provides a basis
for the sense of self. As the self, in the wider sense, is a manifold concept of
staggering complexity, investigating the bodily self is often considered a fruit-
ful approach to break down its minimal constituents and determine how
extended aspects of the self are grounded on the body (e.g., Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009; Damasio, 1999).
An important strategy has been to exploit the insights offered by the
scientific study and phenomenological accounts of persons undergoing
altered perceptions of their bodies. Such understanding of the bodily self
and its neural mechanisms may also provide clues about the nature of
altered states of consciousness (ASC), which often involve bodily manipu-
lations in their induction (e.g., drug intake, exhaustion, fasting, body
posture) and a modification of body representations as a consequence
(illusions, hallucinations, and delusions involving body parts or the whole
body, as well as its spatial location). Before we describe specific cases of
alterations of the bodily self in clinical neurology and other states of
altered consciousness, we first discuss the nature of the bodily self and
introduce the concept of altered states of bodily consciousness.
The bodily self is a more restricted concept than the notion of embodi-
ment, which can be defined as the idea that cognitive functions such as
perception, language, reasoning, and social interaction are grounded on
bodily processing (Gibbs, 2006). By contrast, the bodily self as a theoreti-
cal concept refers to those aspects of the self that can be associated with
the structure and functions of the individual’s body. Culture, society, per-
sonal memories, and politics can probably be “embodied” to some extent,
but the bodily self only relates to an organism’s more basic properties,
such as how we localize our own body in the environment, perceive its
ongoing posture and movement, detect changes in internal homeostasis,
experience its actions to be self-generated, and identify its parts as self-
belonging (Bermu´dez et al., 1995; Legrand, 2006).
The bodily self is historically associated to other concepts such as cor-
poreal awareness, cenesthesia, the body schema, and the body image.
Generally, all these notions refer to how the body is consciously or uncon-
sciously experienced and represented. The brain is constantly receiving
and sending, as well as updating, information from and to the body.
Giving rise to the bodily self thus involves the dynamic integration of vis-
ual, tactile, proprioceptive, vestibular, auditory, olfactive, visceral, and
motor information, as well as higher-order representations such as beliefs,
desires, memories, and knowledge about bodies in general. This integra-
tion is achieved not by a single system in the brain but by a wide array
of subsystems and bodily representations that, when impaired, can lead
to altered states of bodily consciousness.
The very idea of the bodily self is closely tied to clinical neurology. The
concept was born out of the observation of neurological disturbances affect-
ing how some patients perceived their own body. French otologist Pierre
Bonnier (1905) coined the word asche´matie in 1905 precisely to refer to
such disorders following severe vestibular impairments. The schema of the
body, according to Bonnier, is a general sense of space, mostly unconscious,
that transcends sensory modalities. This sense allows one to locate one’s
own body in the environment, feel the space it is occupying, know its cur-
rent posture, and localize tactile sensations on its surface. Some neurologi-
cal symptoms, Bonnier realized, seemed to suggest that such a sense
existed and was disturbed in specific occurrences. Other authors indepen-
dently presented similar ideas. British neurologists Henry Head and Gordon
Holmes (1911–1912) notably highlighted the importance of motor mecha-
nisms and the ability of the body schema to automatically and involuntary
238 Altering Consciousness
update its representations by integrating ongoing movements and postural
changes. These authors located the body schema, or what they called “an
organized model of ourselves,” in the parietal lobe.1
Although terminology has differed widely ever since these early pro-
posals, the bodily self and its neural basis have to a large extent continued
to be studied through manifestation of its disorders. Throughout this
chapter, we use the term altered states of bodily consciousness to refer to dis-
turbances of the bodily self. In such states, the person does not perceive
his or her own body accurately, that is, the current state of the physical
body is misrepresented (Revonsuo, Kallio, & Sikka, 2009).
Erroneous representations of the body differ widely as to their content.
They can involve a specific body part, half of the body, the entire body, or
the internal organs. Following neurological damage or interference to one
hemisphere, symptoms often tend to be unilateral. Sometimes, however,
disorders can extend bilaterally and even to the entire body. It is thus
important, from a neuroscientific point of view, to ascertain the exact
territory of the altered perceptions of the body, as this can point to the
involvement of specific neural mechanisms.
Sometimes, the body is the only aspect undergoing an alteration, while
perception of the environment or other persons is spared. On other occa-
sions, however, altered states of bodily consciousness seem to involve an
extension of the bodily self to external objects, other persons, or even
one’s surroundings. Indeed, dissolution of bodily boundaries, loss of
ego, oceanic boundlessness, regressive, primitive, and infantile states
(e.g., Mogar, 1990/1965) are not infrequent manifestations of mystical
states, epileptic seizures, and psychiatric conditions referred to as
ego-psychopathology (Scharfetter, 1981) [see Carden˜a, this volume]. The
distinctions between self and other, self and object, as well as between self
and world, and their disturbance during altered states of bodily conscious-
ness, might thus also be associated with specific underlying neural mech-
anisms (e.g., Maravita & Iriki, 2004).
Independently of the content of the bodily misrepresentation, the per-
son’s awareness of such bodily illusions can vary. Patients can also behave
quite differently according to how they perceive (or fail to perceive) unusual
body experiences. Three broad categories might help disentangle very
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1Whereas body schema is somewhat closer to our use of bodily self, the term body image has
often been used to refer to the conscious apraisal of one’s body, involving visual, mnesic,
verbal, emotional, sexual, social, and cultural information pertaining to one’s own body.
Both terms—body schema and body image—were and still are often used interchangeably
(for a recent discussion, see de Vignemont, 2010).
different experiential approaches from each other: A person might be indif-
ferent to what he or she is experiencing, critical about the illusory or unusual
nature of his or her experiences, or delusional about certain specific beliefs
concerning the bodily self (Dieguez, Staub, & Bogousslavsky, 2007).
Neurological patients who are indifferent do not notice that their per-
ception and experience of their bodily self is anomalous. Such disorders
are thus found only when an external person (e.g., the clinician) specifically
investigates and detects the disorder. Thus the patient may be asked, for
example, to move a limb or to describe her current bodily experience and
only then respond in a way that is indicative of an altered state of bodily
consciousness. In some cases, patients cannot even be brought to realize
that they are misguided about their perceptions and beliefs concerning their
bodies. This is the case of neurological patients who ignore their paralysis
(anosognosia) or fail to pay any attention to the existence of half of their
body (hemiasomatognosia).
In other instances, patients are critical of the alteration of the bodily
self they are undergoing, and a rational evaluation as well as a generally
accurate perception of the illusory nature of the experience can be
achieved. For instance, patients retaining full awareness during migraine
or seizure episodes may be able to describe in some detail, even during
such experiences, how they perceive their bodies as abnormal.
Finally, patients presenting delusional alterations of bodily conscious-
ness hold false beliefs that are impervious to any attempt at correction.
Such patients not only perceive and report that something is wrong about
their bodies but also claim that the alteration is actually happening or re-
ally has happened. Examples include reduplication of body parts, disow-
nership of one’s body parts, and claims of being invaded by bugs or
having one’s internal organs rotting. In the next sections, we describe in
more detail such instances of altered states of bodily consciousness.
Neurological Alterations of Bodily Consciousness
In what follows, we present selected examples of altered states of
bodily consciousness caused by neurological disease. These disorders pro-
vide relatively “pure” instances of altered states of bodily consciousness,
which have been extensively described and studied since the end of the
19th century, and furthermore allow a unique window into the
neurological basis of bodily consciousness (Blanke, Arzy, & Landis,
2008; Dieguez, Staub, & Bogousslavsky, 2007).
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Phantom Limbs, Illusory Movements, Supernumerary Phantom Limbs
The phantom limb phenomenon is present, transiently or perma-
nently, in the majority of amputees (Brugger, 2005; Ramachandran &
Hirstein, 1998). Persons with phantom limbs vividly experience the pres-
ence of a limb that is physically absent. This is perhaps the clearest dem-
onstration of the existence of a body schema implemented as a cerebral
body representation. Indeed, it has been reported that cortical damage
can dispel phantom limbs (Appenzeller & Bicknelle, 1969) and that
experimental manipulations of the vestibular system (Andre´, Martinet,
Paysant, Beis, & Le Chapelain, 2001) or stimulation of premotor cortex
(Bestmann et al., 2006) can modify phantom limb experiences. Research
on phantom limbs suggests the causal involvement of a plastic reorganiza-
tion of somatosensory and motor areas, a multilayered and innate network
underlying bodily experience dubbed the “neuromatrix,” cross-callosal
hemispheric interactions, as well as complex multimodal interactions
(Giummarra, Gibson, Georgiou-Karistianis, & Bradshaw, 2007).
Nonamputated individuals can also experience phantom limbs in the
form of illusory movements. These refer to the experience that some hemi-
plegic patients have of performing movements without actually moving.
When confronted with their failure to move, most patients acknowledge
their mistake, but some will vehemently maintain that a movement has
been performed despite evidence to the contrary (Ramachandran, 1995).
These patients are often unaware of their paralysis (see below, anosognosia)
or present unilateral neglect (Feinberg, Roane, & Ali, 2000). It is unclear,
however, whether these claims reflect a genuine illusory movement or a
verbal confabulation. Indeed, illusory movements are sometimes accom-
panied by delusional claims, such as when a patient not only claims hav-
ing performed a movement but having seen his arm move or being able
to perform and hear sounds of clapping, or even being able to touch the
clinician’s nose (Ramachandran, 1995). In nondelusional patients with
hemiplegia, illusory movements can be induced by providing a false visual
feedback using a fake hand placed where the patient thinks his real hand
lies, whereas patients unaware of their paralysis tend to perceive self-
generated movements in the fake hand even when the latter remains
motionless (Fotopoulou et al., 2008). Hemiplegic patients presenting dis-
orders of the body schema also tend to experience movements in their
paralyzed limb when looking at mirror-reflected movements of their con-
tralateral healthy limb (Zampini, Moro, & Aglioti, 2004). Lesions associ-
ated to illusory movements involve predominantly the right hemisphere
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and most often the frontal and parietal but also the temporal cortex
(Feinberg et al., 2000). It is also possible to induce illusory movements
by stimulating electrically the right temporo-parietal junction (Blanke,
Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002), in which case the illusion may have
not only sensorimotor but also visual characteristics such as “seeing” that
one’s own limbs are approaching one’s face.
Such phenomena should be distinguished from supernumerary phan-
tom limbs, a condition defined as the perceptual experience of an addi-
tional body part, felt as an entity sharing properties of a real body part
and occupying a different place in space. Unlike patients with illusory
movements, patients with supernumerary phantom limb distinctly experi-
ence a “third arm.” Some can critically evaluate the feeling as an illusion,
but others will entertain the delusion that they actually own an additional
limb or even experience more numerous duplications of arms or legs and
perceive these multiple limbs as real. In the latter case, the term delusional
reduplication of body parts has been proposed (Weinstein, Kahn, Malitz, &
Rozanski, 1954). Most supernumerary phantom limbs involve a some-
sthetic perception of an immobile limb, localized separately but on the
same side as the paralyzed limb (Antoniello, Kluger, Sahlein, & Heilman,
2009). Movements of such phantoms are usually rare and most often auto-
matic or involuntary. It can also happen that the “extra limb” simply
mimics the movements of the contralateral real limb or follows with some
delay the movements of the ipsilateral real limb (McGonigle et al., 2002).
There are, however, two cases in the literature describing intentional
supernumerary phantoms in which the patients, paralyzed on one side,
nevertheless experienced the movement of a phantom limb whenever
(and only when) they wished to move it (Khateb et al., 2009; Staub et al.,
2006). What is more, one of these patients also claimed to be able to see
the phantom and “use” it to scratch her own face (Khateb et al., 2009),
pointing to multimodal pathomechanisms [mechanisms by which a patho-
logical conditions occurs] and similarities to heautoscopy, exosomesthesia,
and asomatoscopy (see below). Lesions have involved the right basal gan-
glia (Halligan, Marshall, & Wade, 1993), the right subcortical capsulolen-
ticular region (Khateb et al., 2009), the left anterior choroidal artery
territory (Staub et al., 2006), the right frontomesial cortex (McGonigle
et al., 2002), and parietal structures in the case of delusional reduplications
(Weinstein et al., 1954). A few functional neuroimaging studies have been
conducted in such patients, showing activity in the supplemental motor
area during phantom movements mimicking movements of the duplicated
limb (McGonigle et al., 2002), abnormal activity in subcortical thalamo-
cortical loops during intentional movements of the phantom (Staub et al.,
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2006), and activity in somatosensory and visual areas correlating with the
patient’s claim of being able to feel and see her intentionally moved super-
numerary phantom limb (Khateb et al., 2009). Given the variety of phe-
nomenological profiles, it is unlikely that a single explanation can
account for all cases of supernumerary phantom limb. Purely postural
phantoms probably can be explained as the result of a conflict between
impaired current proprioceptive afferences, caused by thalamo-cortical
disconnections, and a spared internal representation of the body. Kin-
esthetic phantoms may best be conceptualized as the result of preserved
motor efferences and action planning in the context of defective multimo-
dal integration (Khateb et al., 2009). Additional pathomechanisms involv-
ing other modalities and higher cognitive functions could be involved in
cases with delusional beliefs.
The diversity of phantom limb phenomena, whether arising from
amputation or brain damage, points to a complex and highly efficient net-
work of body-related brain functions that smoothly provide a coherent
bodily self in healthy persons.
Tactile Hallucinations and Mislocalizations
Whereas visual and auditory hallucinations have been defined accord-
ing to the absence of an external object giving rise to a percept, tactile hallu-
cinations have led to conceptual problems, as it is not easy to objectively
ascertain the absence of itches, numbness, and aches (Berrios, 1982). For
instance, amputees can feel so-called “referred sensations” in a nonexisting
limb concomitantly with a brush to specific body parts (Cronholm, 1951;
Ramachandran&Hirstein, 1998). Although the sensation is felt in a nonexist-
ing limb, the regularity of the phenomenon argues against a hallucination.
Unusual or altered tactile experiences have frequently been reported in
the neurological literature. Like visual hallucinations, tactile misperceptions
range from the simple to the elaborate. Parkinson’s disease and related dis-
orders are a frequent etiology of simple tactile hallucinations (Fe´ne´lon, Tho-
bois, Bonnet, Broussolle, & Tison, 2002), whereas in advanced dementia,
psychiatric conditions, substance abuse, and cerebrovascular disease,
patients sometimes present with delusional parasitosis, the type of above-
mentioned “bugs” hallucinations, also called Ekbom’s syndrome or derma-
tozoic hallucination (de Leon, Antelo, & Simpson, 1992).
The absence of tactile awareness from one body part is a frequent
accompanying feature of many disorders discussed in this chapter. So-
called paresthesias, most notably, are a frequent first alert to patients
undergoing a neurological event. These involve tinglings, pins and
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needles, numbness, and alterations in the experience of weight, size, tem-
perature, and motricity, even in the absence of motor disorders. In turn,
such feelings can lead to an experience of alienation from one’s body parts
and even partial depersonalization, perhaps underlying rare cases of appa-
rently healthy persons who wish to be amputated (Blanke, Morgenthaler,
Brugger, & Overney, 2009).
Neurologists have also observed mislocalizations of touch following
brain damage. The phenomenon of alloesthesia refers to the perceptual
transfer, usually from left to right (in the case of right-sided brain dam-
age), of tactile sensations (Bender, 1970). Such patients are usually not
aware of their mistakes. Although alloesthesia is most often caused by
large lesions in the temporo-parietal areas of the right hemisphere, similar
tactile mislocalizations are easily induced in about a quarter of healthy
participants under laboratory conditions (Marcel et al., 2004).
Perhaps more strikingly, touch can sometimes be experienced outside
of one’s body. This is what some rare reports have referred to as exosome-
thesia. This experience can happen under a variety of conditions, for in-
stance during testing for alloesthesia (Shapiro, Fink, & Bender, 1952)
and in Tourette’s syndrome (Karp & Hallett, 1996). As mentioned earlier,
amputees sometimes report tactile sensations in their phantom limbs.
However, there is at least one instance of “phantom exosomesthesia” in
which an amputee has reported a referred touch as arising from slightly
outside of the phantom (Cronholm, 1951). Some persons otherwise
healthy also report feeling touch when they see someone else being
touched, a synesthetic experience related to empathic tendencies (Banissy
& Ward, 2007). However, it does not seem that these individuals actually
feel touch as if it arose in the other person (i.e., they feel it in their own
body concomitantly to the touch they see on the other person). It is never-
theless relatively easy to induce the experience of touch as arising from
objects or fake body parts, usually by inducing visuo-tactile conflicts (Bot-
vinick & Cohen, 1998), but also after practice with an extended tool (Mar-
avita & Iriki, 2004) and the induction of spatially contiguous tactile inputs
(Miyazaki, Hirashima, & Nozaki, 2010). A feeling of numbness seemingly
arising from someone else’s finger can also be achieved simply by simulta-
neously touching one’s own finger together with another person’s finger
(Dieguez, Mercier, Newby, & Blanke, 2009).
Bodily Transformations (Illusory Amputation, Size Changes, Disconnections)
Some neurological patients can experience the sensation that a part of
their body has vanished. These are cases of “sensation of absence” or “true
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sensation of amputation” (as opposed to amputees who feel a phantom
limb and have an experience of bodily completeness and therefore do
not feel their amputation as an absence), and are part of what Frederiks
(1963a) named conscious hemiasomatognosia (see below, hemiasomatognosia
and anosognosia), meaning a critical awareness that something is lacking
from one’s bodily experience. This symptom has also been described in
the visual modality, whereby a patient reports being unable to see a spe-
cific part of her body (asomatoscopy) following restricted damage to the
right premotor and motor cortices (Arzy, Overney, Landis, & Blanke,
2006). Similar phenomena involve the feeling that a limb is detached
from the body, as if it were floating at some distance from the trunk
(Podoll & Robinson, 2002), or that the body is split in two halves
(Heydrich, Dieguez, Grunwald, Seeck, & Blanke, 2010). Such experiences
are usually short lived and happen mostly during epileptic seizures,
migraine events, or vascular stroke (He´caen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952) affect-
ing premotor, primary motor, or parietal cortex, as well as subcortical
structures of either hemisphere. These illusions can appear in isolation,
without any accompanying neurological symptoms.
Other phenomena are characterized by more diffuse sensations of ali-
enness, disconnection, or absence of body parts from the rest of the body,
which are felt as numb, anesthetized, or empty. These forms have been
called hemi-depersonalization (Heydrich et al., 2010; Lhermitte, 1939), as
an analogy to full-fledged depersonalization, which usually involves the
entire bodily self.
The terms micro- and macrosomatognosia refer to alterations in the per-
ception of size and weight of certain body parts (Frederiks, 1963b). Thus,
a limb can be experienced as shrunken to the size of a baby’s hand or gro-
tesquely immense (sometimes also referred to as Alice in Wonderland
Syndrome; Todd, 1955). Again, such illusions are typically found in
migraine and epilepsy, as well as damage to sensorimotor structures in
either hemisphere.
Hemiasomatognosia, Anosognosia
The term hemiasomatognosia was coined by French neurologist Jean
Lhermitte (1939) to refer to unawareness of a body part or a hemibody.
Frederiks (1963a) tried to clarify some conceptual issues by distinguishing
between conscious and “nonconscious hemiasomatognosia. “Conscious”
hemiasomatognosia refers to patients who perceive their body as incomplete
or amputated while realizing that what they experience is an illusion (see
above, Bodily transformations), whereas “nonconscious” hemiasomatognosia
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refers to the disappearance of body parts from one’s awareness, the patient
being unable to notice or report this disappearance.
Subforms of nonconscious hemiasomatognosia are currently known as
personal neglect, motor neglect, or anosognosia for hemiplegia. In all
these conditions, there is indifference, forgetfulness, or unawareness for
parts of one’s own body. Personal neglect refers to the classical picture
where a patient forgets to comb, shave, or make up the left side of his or
her face. Motor neglect refers to patients who underuse or fail to use
altogether their left limbs despite having no motor impairment. Con-
versely, patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia behave as if they were
not paralyzed, as they ignore their left hemibody altogether and/or deny
that there is anything wrong with it. Nevertheless, anosognosia for hemi-
plegia is a complex phenomenon, with patients differing widely as to
their explicit and implicit insight of being paralyzed (Cocchini, Beschin,
Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2010). For instance, some patients deny their
impairment but nevertheless never act as if they were not paralyzed, while
others might admit being paralyzed but still attempt actions that are
impossible for them.
Recent lesion-mapping analyses comparing patients with right-
hemispheric damage with and without anosognosia have highlighted the
specific involvement of the right posterior insula (Baier & Karnath,
2008; Karnath, Baier, & Na¨gele, 2005) and an additional network of sen-
sorimotor areas including the somatosensory, primary motor, and premo-
tor cortices, as well as the inferior parietal lobule (Berti et al., 2005).
Anosognosia is a multifaceted syndrome involving defective awareness of
motor control, impaired integration of multimodal information, and dis-
turbances of attentional and cognitive monitoring (Orfei et al., 2007).
Somatoparaphrenia
German neurologist Joseph Gerstmann sought to distinguish between
particular cases of hemiasomatognosia and used the term somatoparaphrenia
for strongly delusional instances (Gerstmann, 1942). Somatoparaphrenia
thus refers to false beliefs concerning a body part or a hemibody, the most
frequent being disownership of one’s hand (whereby patients repeatedly
claim that their own left hands do not belong to them, or more explicitly
that they belong to someone else, the doctor, a nurse, a roommate, or some
undetermined person; review in Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). However, such
delusions can vary considerably, suggesting that the notion covers various
disorders. Some patients will deny the ownership of a limbwithout attribut-
ing it to someone else explicitly. Others will state spontaneously that their
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limb belongs to someone specific, even someone altogether absent from the
current environment or already dead. Some patients will elaborate their
claim by stating that their limb has vanished or has been stolen, sometimes
leading to complaints to the hospital staff. The strength of the delusion can
also vary, some patients being able to acknowledge that there is something
bizarre about their belief and others maintaining their claims despite over-
whelming counter-evidence.
Moreover, there are two types of misattribution in somatoparaphrenia:
Parts of one’s own body can be attributed to someone else or, conversely,
parts of someone else’s body can be attributed to oneself (Gertmann,
1942). Patients with somatoparaphrenia can display strong emotional
reactions—for instance, they can fall from their bed after trying to “kick
out” what they think is an alien limb. Similarly, patients presenting with
misoplegia can display hatred of the paralyzed limb that borders on the
delusional but without presenting explicit feelings of disownership
(Loetscher, Regard, & Brugger, 2006).
Some cases of somatoparaphrenia suggest an association with other
disorders of the body schema such as supernumerary phantom limbs,
when a limb is disowned while an “extra” one is present, or the feeling
of a presence, when the disowned limb is perceived as a whole person
lying nearside in the bed.
Most of the reported cases of somatoparaphrenia involve the left side of
the body following a right-sided stroke. Lesions generally involve an
extended fronto-temporo-parietal network, with a predominance of pos-
terior areas, such as the temporo-parietal junction, the posterior insula,
as well as subcortical structures (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Involvement of
medial frontal and orbitofrontal areas seems to distinguish delusional
types of disownership from mildest types of limb estrangement (Feinberg
et al., 2010). Interestingly, the posterior insula is the most commonly
involved area in both somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia for hemiplegia
(Baier & Karnath, 2008). Although these two disorders can be separated,
this finding nevertheless suggests that, at both the clinical and anatomical
level, awareness of action and ownership of body parts are tightly linked
(Baier & Karnath, 2008).
Whole-body Hallucinations, Vestibular Hallucinations, Autoscopic Phenomena
We now turn to altered states of bodily consciousness involving the
entire body. Most of the disorders described in the previous sections, as
well as others we haven’t addressed here, can conceptually be extended
to the entire body (see Blanke et al., 2008; Dieguez et al., 2007).
Altered States of Bodily Consciousness 247
Almost four centuries ago, Descartes was greatly impressed by
accounts of phantom limbs in amputees, which might have led him to
wonder about the potential results of a “radical amputation” in the fourth
part of his Discourse on the Method (1637) (as suggested by Ferret, 1998,
pp. 161–162). Would amputation of the whole body unleash a “phantom
body,” just like an amputated arm “releases” a phantom limb (see also
Mitchell, 1905/1866)? Later, Lhermitte (1939) proposed the concept of
“complete asomatognosia” to refer to an extreme form of depersonalization
(sometimes called Cotard’s syndrome) as a full-body analogy to his con-
cept of hemiasomatognosia. In such cases, patients may go as far as to
claim to be nonexistent or dead (Young & Leafhead, 1996).
The extension of altered states of bodily consciousness from body parts
to the whole body seems to require the involvement of the vestibular sys-
tem. Vestibular disturbances are indeed known to induce dissociations
between the experienced and the actual posture, movement, and orienta-
tion of the body. In the tilt-room illusion, for instance, patients might feel
a complete disconnect between the actual position of their bodies and the
orientation of their surroundings, which can appear tilted as far as 90°
(Tiliket, Ventre-Dominey, Vighetto, & Grochowicki, 1996). More diffuse
disturbances are also found in patients with vestibular disturbances and
healthy participants undergoing caloric vestibular stimulation [water or
air irrigation into the auditory canal], a procedure that stimulates the ves-
tibular system and induces symptoms comparable to depersonalization
(Sang, Ja´uregui-Renaud, Green, Bronstein, & Gresty, 2006). Interestingly,
caloric vestibular stimulation has been shown to activate brain areas
involved in several altered states of bodily consciousness, including the
right temporo-parietal junction and posterior insula (Fasold et al., 2002)
and also to alleviate such symptoms (Bisiach, Rusconi, Vallar, 1991).
Bodily mislocalizations, hallucinations of body parts, and supernumer-
ary phantom limbs have recently been linked to autoscopic phenomena
(Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004; Brugger, 2002). This group of
disorders involves multimodal illusions inducing the experience of more
or less complete duplicata of one’s own body. An autoscopic hallucination
is one where experiencers perceive a visual double of themselves in
extrapersonal space. However, such visual perception of one’s body can
also involve mislocalizations of the bodily self. Thus, during heautoscopy,
a person can experience the bodily self alternatively, or even at the same
time, in the physical and the seen body. In neurological patients under-
going this Doppelga¨nger experience, an involvement of the left temporo-
parietal junction and the left mesiobasal temporal lobe has been found
(Blanke & Mohr, 2005). In an out-of-body experience, a person feels her
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self as spatially localized outside of the physical body and experiences see-
ing the latter from an elevated perspective (see below).
Another related illusion, referred to as the feeling of a presence, is char-
acterized by a closely “projected” double that is not visible (Brugger, Regard,
& Landis, 1997). The “presence” of a person can be felt sideways, behind,
or in front of one’s physical body, and may even involve multiple “presen-
ces” (Brugger, Blanke, Regard, Bradford, & Landis, 2006). Such a feeling
of presence has been induced by cortical electrical stimulation of the pos-
terior part of the left superior and middle temporal gyrus (Arzy, Seeck,
Ortigue, Spinelli, & Blanke, 2006). For both heautoscopy and the feeling
of presence, damage to or abnormal activity in parietal and temporal-
limbic structures, and a resulting vestibular dysfunction, have been posited
as plausible pathomechanisms underlying such complex experiences.
Out-of-body and Near-death Experiences
The out-of-body experience (OBE) can be defined as a waking experi-
ence combining disembodiment, elevated perspective, and autoscopy.
However, specific features, such as how the “disembodied self” is per-
ceived, the modalities involved, the ability to move, and so forth, can vary
widely across persons (Alvarado, 2000), suggesting multiple etiologies
and mechanisms. The neural correlates of such extraordinary experiences
are beginning to be understood, highlighting the roles of multisensory
integration and vestibular processes. An OBE was recently induced by
cortical electrical stimulations during presurgical investigations for intrac-
table epilepsy (Blanke et al., 2002). At lower intensities, stimulation of the
right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) induced simple vestibular illusions,
whereas stronger intensities at the same region induced an OBE (see also
De Ridder, Van Laere, Dupont, Menovsky, & Van de Heyning, 2007).
The rTPJ, and especially the angular gyrus and posterior superior tempo-
ral gyrus, was later found to be the critical overlapping region in a group
of brain-damaged and epileptic patients with OBE (Blanke et al., 2004;
Blanke & Mohr, 2005), and was involved in a task where healthy partici-
pants had to mentally project themselves out of their body to resolve a task
of laterality (Blanke et al., 2005).
Studies of persons with sleep paralysis reporting OBE-like experiences
and related disorders, as well as healthy persons with an experience of
OBE (about 5–10% of the general population report at least one such
experience during a lifetime; Alvarado, 2000), suggest that neural mecha-
nisms related to REM intrusion (Nelson, Mattingly, & Schmitt, 2007), the
vestibular and motor system (Cheyne & Girard, 2009), emotions (Nielsen,
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2007), synesthetic tendencies (Terhune, 2009), as well as personality fac-
tors such as absorption, dissociation, schizotypy, and body image dissatis-
faction (reviewed in Blanke & Dieguez, 2009) are associated with the
experience of disembodiment and altered states of bodily consciousness
involving the whole body.
Such mechanisms are also likely involved in OBEs that occur under
stressful events or extreme medical situations, so-called “near-death experi-
ences” (Blanke & Dieguez, 2009; Holden, Greyson, & James, 2009). In
addition to disembodiment, such experiences may be associated with the
experience of a passage through darkness or a “tunnel,” the perception of
a “divine” light, a “panoramic” review of one’s life memories, and encounters
with “spirits” or deceased relatives. As one early observer put it, the NDE, by
its very nature, seems “made to astonish; fast, unexpected, extraordinary,
usually poorly understood, it takes the appearance of an internal marvel; it
gives rise to illusions and legends” (Egger, 1896, p. 367). Mild disturbances
of the temporal lobe and altered sleep patterns have been found in a
restricted sample of persons with NDE (Britton & Bootzin, 2004), as well
as a higher prevalence of REM intrusions in waking life than in a control
group (Nelson, Mattingly, Lee, & Schmitt, 2006), pointing to similar
sleep-related mechanisms as for OBEs. Nevertheless, at this stage it is diffi-
cult to envision a neurocognitive account of NDEs as there is a dearth of sys-
tematic empirical neuroscientific research on this class of phenomena,
perhaps due to its paranormal overtones and the lack of a consistent and
operational definition. Indeed, a number of conditions have been reported
to induce similar experiences, most often involving some alteration of
the bodily self and not being necessarily life-threatening, such as syncope
(Lempert, Bauer, & Schmidt, 1994), intracranial brain stimulation (Vignal,
Maillard, McGonigal, & Chauvel, 2007), the perception of danger (Noyes
& Kletti, 1977), and psychological stress (Siegel, 1984).
All in all, it seems that the OBE in neurological patients, healthy per-
sons, and under life-threatening situations, is associated with a disintegra-
tion of sensory modalities, notably vestibular, visual, and proprioceptive
information, together with a variety of factors reflecting cognitive, emo-
tional, and perhaps cultural factors, leading to failures of self-localization
and displacement of the first-person perspective.
Behavioral and Experimental Alterations of Bodily Consciousness
We cover in this section a variety of “classical” altered states of con-
sciousness and how they affect the bodily self, as well as experimental
methods developed to study the bodily self in the laboratory.
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Mystical States
Altered states of consciousness associated with mystical states or medi-
tation have been reported to induce alterations of bodily consciousness
from times immemorial. In these states, ”dissolution of the ego” or “pure
consciousness” are often reported, referring to an experienced merging
of the self and bodily self with external space and accompanied by a felt
transcendence from spatial and temporal constraints, a sense of sacredness
and ineffability, and an overall positive mood (Pahnke & Richards, 1990/
1966; Wulff, 2000). Such states can also be close to, or even cause, OBE-
and NDE-like episodes. An involvement of the limbic system, associated
to a sudden release of endorphins (Prince, 1982) or in the form of ecstatic
epileptic seizures of temporal lobe origin (Picard & Craig, 2009), has been
highlighted as a neurobiological correlate of such experiences. A recent
investigation of the impact of brain damage on the personality trait “tran-
scendent self” also suggests the importance of the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (Urgesi, Aglioti, Skrap, & Fabbro, 2010), an area also involved in
other cases of altered bodily awareness of body parts (such as anosognosia
and somatoparaphrenia) as well as illusory full-body perceptions (such as
out-of-body experiences). Physical and environmental factors can also be
involved, as experiences of bodily dissolution and separation of the self
and body have been reported during physical exhaustion of runners
(Morgan, 2002) and in high-altitude mountaineers (Brugger, Regard,
Landis, & Oelz, 1999).
Hypnosis
Hypnosis is perhaps the most compelling area of overlap between neu-
rology and ASC, at least historically [see Carden˜a & Alvarado, Volume 1].
Early investigation of “hysteric” patients suggested an influence of hypno-
sis on bodily function and experience. At least in certain persons,
neurological-like symptoms have been relieved or induced by different
methods of hypnosis. Most notably, anaesthesia/analgesia and paralysis
during hypnosis have been the focus of much attention and recently been
revived in neuroscientific research (Cojan et al., 2009). Hypnotic induc-
tion of altered states of bodily consciousness has also been incorporated
as a tool in the cognitive neurosciences of belief formation in healthy par-
ticipants (e.g., Cox & Barnier, 2010). We also note that hypnosis has been
used to induce OBEs (Irwin, 1989). Although the mechanisms underlying
hypnosis are far from understood, these findings point to the importance
of suggestibility and higher-order belief systems, as well as the influence
Altered States of Bodily Consciousness 251
of conducive bodily states (e.g., quiescence, Carden˜a, 2005), as part of the
etiology of altered states of bodily consciousness.
Drugs
Drugs have probably been the most salient artificial inducer of ASC
throughout history, and complex alterations of the bodily self have long
been reported following intoxication by a wide array of substances [see
Presti, this volume]. For instance, Havelock Ellis vividly described the
bodily experiences of a mescal user, who reported feelings of heaviness
in one leg while the rest of the body seemed to dematerialize, the back of
his head splitting in two and releasing flows of vivid colors, wind rushing
through his hair, sensations of lightness and contraction, visual hallucina-
tions of parts of his own body, and the feeling of being inside his own
body and looking through it as through a thin transparent skin (in
Lhermitte, 1939, pp. 167–168). In addition to feelings of “dissolution”
and various forms of transformations, “getting high” often involves the
sensation of levitating and flying, as well as leaving one’s body, as
described by French poet and painter Henri Michaux in his monograph
on the effects of marijuana (Michaux, 1967, pp. 132–135).
Indeed, apart from well-known effects such as distortion of sense of
time, increase in self-confidence, heightened awareness, and complex
mental associations (Hastings, 1990/1969), marijuana is also well known
to influence bodily consciousness. Charles Tart (1971) conducted a sur-
vey of marijuana users that showed a very wide range of bodily self alter-
ations: Users sometimes experience their whole body as bigger or smaller
than usual, the shape of their body as strangely altered, the body felt as
numb, as well as full-blown OBEs.
The “Good Friday” experiment conducted by Pahnke in 1962 (see
follow-up by Doblin, 1991) demonstrated that psilocybin, unlike a placebo,
allowed inducing mystical states along with alterations of bodily conscious-
ness sometimes similar to OBEs and NDEs. More recently, Griffiths and col-
laborators replicated this finding in a better-controlled setting, and
participants likewise reported experiences of unity with their surroundings,
loss of self, somaesthetic hallucinations and sensations similar to OBEs and
NDEs (Griffiths, Richards, McCann, & Jesse, 2006). Reporting on the
effects of LSD, Pahnke and Richards (1990/1966) also described a wide
range of bodily effects, such as “intriguing somatic sensations, feeling as
though [the] body is melting, falling apart, or exploding into minute frag-
ments” (p. 493), “changes in kinesthetic and cutaneous reception” and
“claims of merging with floorboards or feeling unity with the walls of a
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room” (p. 497). Finally, anesthetics are also known to induce alterations of
bodily consciousness for body parts (including feelings of disownership;
Paqueron et al., 2003), as well as OBEs and NDEs (Corazza & Schifano,
2010).
Experimental Procedures
Experiments in sensory deprivation have been used as a powerful scien-
tific tool for investigating the interactions between bodily awareness and
cognition. In such studies, participants lie in an isolation tank, deprived of
as many sensory signals as possible (Zubek, 1969). The effects of such
experiments have been compared to medical conditions involving sensory
and motor impairments (Jackson, Pollard, & Kansky, 1962) and more
recently to the effects of mind-altering drugs (Mason & Brady, 2009).
Altered states of bodily consciousness have also been reported during such
conditions, with illusory movements, complex tactile hallucinations, feel-
ings of a presence, depersonalization, and OBEs (Heron, 1957).
As is the case with other ASC, it is known that OBEs are favorably
induced when lying down or relaxing (Zingrone, Alvarado, & Carden˜a,
2010), an important observation in the light of accounts of the OBE in
terms of vestibular hallucination (Schwabe & Blanke, 2008). Individuals
claiming to be able to deliberately self-induce OBEs have also used a vari-
ety of sensory deprivation and meditation methods (reviewed in Black-
more, 1982). More recently, laboratory investigations have delineated
controlled approaches to induce, or at least mimic, some aspects of OBEs.
Most notably, visuo-tactile conflicts have been exploited to investigate the
OBE (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007).
These studies have used virtual reality as a method to provide participants
with visual perceptions of their own bodies (via a recording camera feed-
ing a head-mounted display) while experiencing tactile sensations congru-
ent or incongruent with those applied to their visual double. Measures of
self-location and subjective reports about self-identity in such experiments
have revealed the importance of congruent visuo-tactile information for
the bodily self (review in Aspell & Blanke, 2009).
These paradigms have been inspired by experimental approaches to
modify bodily consciousness of body parts. The rubber-hand illusion,
for instance, operates under similar visuo-tactile conflicts, whereby a per-
son looks at a fake hand being stroked by a brush while feeling the same
sensation on her real (and hidden) hand. In such circumstances, it is often
reported that the felt brushes seem to be located onto the fake hand, and
objective measures reveal that participants experience their real hand to
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be located closer to the fake hand than it really is (Botvinick & Cohen,
1998). Interestingly, feelings of illusory ownership during the rubber-
hand illusion have been found to correlate with objective changes in tem-
perature in the real hand (Moseley et al., 2008), suggesting that similar
processes underlie experimentally-induced illusory ownership in healthy
persons and a number of psychiatric and neurological conditions involv-
ing altered states of bodily consciousness (reviewed in Moseley et al.,
2008). Coupled with clinical investigations, the experimental study of
full-body illusions provides a very promising approach for understanding
the neurocognitive processes underlying the bodily self and altered states
of bodily consciousness.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have covered a wide array of altered states of bodily
consciousness. Perhaps most striking is the sheer phenomenological vari-
ety of these bodily experiences. Misrepresentations of the physical body
can involve selected body parts, half of the body, or the entire body and
self. Whereas some of them are critically perceived as illusory by the expe-
rient, even sought after in some cases, others can be outright delusional.
Their content can involve varied phenomena such as mislocalizations,
illusory movements, presence of nonexistent body parts, disappearance
of body parts, size and shape transformations, denial of ownership, incor-
poration of external objects, merging of boundaries, complete disembodi-
ment, and denial of impairment.
At this stage, an encompassing theoretical framework to explain and
reliably induce such states is not available. It is indeed difficult to assess
to what extent these complex misrepresentations, which can occur after
neurological damage or in psychiatric conditions but also spontaneously
and under experimental circumstances, are comparable. Nevertheless,
the distinction between altered states of bodily consciousness involving
body parts and the whole body (Dieguez et al., 2007) and the segregation
of the bodily self into three core constituents (namely, the first person-
perspective, self-location, and self-identification) suggest preliminary
frameworks (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). Notably, a network in the right
hemisphere involving the temporo-parietal junction, the posterior insula,
and the basal ganglia, as well as premotor and primary sensory structures,
has been identified to be crucially involved in the integration of body parts
and representations of the whole body, as well as the calibration of an ego-
centric spatial frame of reference allowing one to coherently locate one’s
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body with respect to gravity and the surrounding environment. Future work
should allow scientists to fine-grain these observations and disentangle the
systems underlying specific alterations of the bodily self. A worthwhile
question, for instance, would be whether body parts and whole-body
alterations can be mapped unto an anatomo-functional continuum or
whether they arise from different processes altogether.
Most importantly, any insights have been and will be the result of
investigations carried out from a wide range of perspectives, including
analytical philosophy, phenomenology, clinical neuropsychology, experi-
mental psychology, and the cognitive neurosciences. New therapeutic
methods and creative experimental paradigms, incorporating pharmaco-
logical improvements, brain–computer interfaces, as well as robotic and
virtual reality technology, will also emerge in the near future. Merged with
the insights offered by approaches and traditions often considered as out-
side the reach of science, such as hypnosis, shamanism, mysticism, reli-
gious rituals, and the use of mind-altering drugs, the study of altered
states of bodily consciousness holds the potential to offer important scien-
tific insights about the brain processes involved in creating our everyday
experience of the self. Conversely, careful theoretical and conceptual work
on the bodily self can guide our understanding and the development of
experimental approaches to ASC at large.
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